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A PLURALIST THEORY OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
William N. Eskridge, Jr.* 
The Constitution is intimately connected with social “groups.”  Al-
though both the Constitution and the socially relevant groups have 
changed radically over more than two centuries, at least one general 
idea has been constant, and it is reflected in both the Constitution’s 
structure and its deliberative background (“original meaning,” if you 
will).  My argument in this Article is that the Constitution assumes a 
particular normative theory about groups in politics, and this theory 
is pluralism.  I am using “pluralism” to mean a political regime along 
the following lines:  successful government must induce all “relevant” 
(i.e., socially important) groups and their members to invest in and 
commit to government as a forum for their protection and for their 
engagement in politics.1 
Part I of this Article will lay out the Constitution’s evolution as a 
document facilitating the operation of a democratic-pluralist regime.  
Part II derives from this documentary history and the original pur-
pose of the Equal Protection Clause a pluralist theory of groups and 
equal protection.  Part III will suggest the virtues of such a theory and 
apply it to some current cutting edge constitutional issues. 
I.  THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND ITS COMMITMENT 
TO PLURALIST ENGAGEMENT 
Even though the Framers held a variety of views about the nature 
and role of social groups in governance, the Constitution as a docu-
ment has had a stable understanding of their role.  The Constitu-
tion’s relatively stable meta-principle is that all relevant social groups 
should channel their energies into legislative politics, either at the 
national or local arena.  A vigorous politics of group engagement will 
often be acrimonious, but a contentious politics is much better than 
 
 * John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. 
 1 For useful statements of the normative foundations of democratic pluralism that are 
roughly along these lines, see ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  CONFLICT AND CONSENT (1967); ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
MARKET:  POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 
(1991); Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734 (1983). 
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feuds and strife outside of politics.2  Corollaries to this principle in-
clude the following precepts that ought to guide pluralist democra-
cies: 
• participatory deliberation, the ideal that policymaking should 
be the product of open debate among officials accountable to 
an array of different groups, all of which have formal access to 
the institutions of deliberation and implementation; 
• minority protection, the notion that government ought not be a 
mechanism for majority groups to entrench a permanent politi-
cal marginalization of an outnumbered minority;3 and 
• libertarian neutrality, or protections against government proc-
esses being deployed against minority group members, thereby 
undermining their sense of security within the political regime. 
For the purposes of this Article, with its focus on equality protections, 
the second corollary, minority protection, is the most important, but 
I shall say a few words about all three. 
A.  The Constitution of 1789 
The Constitution of 1789 was drafted and adopted to replace the 
dysfunctional governance structure of the Articles of Confederation.  
Its most celebrated feature was the creation of a puissant national 
government, while simultaneously preserving the States as centers of 
power and accountability.  For my purposes, what is most important is 
that the Framers also grasped the essential features of pluralist de-
mocracy and sought to entrench it through the structure of governance.  
 
 2 Starting with THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN:  OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A 
COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL (Michael Oakeshott ed., Basil Blackwell 
1946) (1651), social contract theorists have opined that the core purpose of government 
is to save us from the “brutish” state of nature by providing protection and peaceful 
means for social interaction and dispute resolution.  Modern commentators sometimes 
forget the Hobbesian notion that the government is obliged to provide protection and 
public forums for all its citizens; any failure to provide as much for any salient group of 
citizens would, in Hobbes’s view, justify its departure or even rebellion, as the social con-
tract was nullified for those in the group.  See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 197–98, § 222 (Ian Shapiro ed., 
Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1689) (expanding the role of government to include the protec-
tion of private property and opining that a regime attacking citizens’ property rights 
would justify the people in “resum[ing] their original liberty”). 
 3 See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY:  FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 4–5 (1994) (articulating the historically recognized need to 
avoid pure majoritarianism); Robert A. Dahl, Pluralism Revisited, 10 COMP. POL. 191, 201 
(1978) (noting that “a search ought to be made for mutually beneficial and mutually ac-
ceptable outcomes” between the majority and minority); Michael Parenti, Power and Plu-
ralism:  A View from the Bottom, 32 J. POL. 501, 530 (1970) (implying it would be desirable 
for less stratification to exist in society). 
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In making this argument, I recognize that the Framers did not have 
the same understanding of pluralism or even the groups that we have 
today.  My argument is only that the broad precepts of what we would 
call democratic pluralism are instinct in the Constitution’s structure 
and were explicitly invoked to support its ratification. 
In the 1780s, Americans would not have conceptualized groups as 
we do today, and the pertinent categories would have been different.  
Rather than the race-based group categories that we consider impor-
tant nowadays, early Americans would have considered conflicting 
groups to fall along these lines of political cleavage:  regional and 
state loyalties and rivalries; religious identities and antimonies (like 
Protestant versus Catholic); and economic and social class divisions, 
as between debtors and creditors, merchants and farmers, and the 
like.  Irrelevant to American politics in 1789 would have been persons 
of African descent, Native Americans, women, and men who did not 
have either land or money.  In our modern eyes, none of these exclu-
sions is defensible, but they defined American politics—and Ameri-
can constitutionalism—at the time of the Framing. 
Once groups are understood in this way, a fundamental commit-
ment of the Constitution becomes clear:  policy decisions affecting 
these salient groups will be made by legislators elected by voters 
drawn from these groups or, in the case of the United States Senate, 
elected by the States themselves.  For national law, this commitment 
is made by Article I, Section 7 (the bicameralism and presentment 
requirements for federal statutes) and the Supremacy Clause in Arti-
cle VI.  For state law, this commitment is made by Article IV’s guaran-
tee of a “Republican Form of Government.”4 
The most prominent defenders of the Constitution understood 
that a representative democracy could be selectively oppressive.  In 
James Madison’s terms, factions, which are temporary alliances of var-
ious groups, will tend to gang up on minorities such as property own-
ers, an important group in the Lockean pluralism of the eighteenth 
century.5  The Framers knew their European history, which had many 
examples of a majority imposing its religious views on minority relig-
ions.  This was always a disaster for the country in question—whether 
it was the England of Bloody Mary (1553–58) or the France of Louis 
XIV (1685).  Governmental policies marginalizing or persecuting 
minorities were disastrous for democracy because (in modern par-
 
 4  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 5 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  Specific 
page references to the Federalist will be to the 1961 Clinton Rossiter edition. 
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lance) they raised the stakes of politics, fed private inter-group bitter-
ness, and drove minority groups away from politics.  As Madison put 
it shortly before the Philadelphia Convention, “equality . . . ought to 
be the basis of every law,” and the law should not subject some per-
sons to “peculiar burdens” or grant others “peculiar exemptions.”6 
Madison and his then-ally Alexander Hamilton recognized fac-
tional politics as a serious threat to the whole enterprise of American 
government, and their Constitution articulated three different kinds 
of protections against the permanent marginalization and oppression 
of important property, religious, and other groups.  Most of the pro-
tections were structural.  The main idea was that the Constitution’s 
separation of powers in Articles I through III would head off “unjust 
and partial laws,” to use Hamilton’s phrase.7 
First, the Framers expected that Article I, Section 7 would instanti-
ate deliberative politics with wide-ranging group input before legisla-
tures could create new statutes.  No national statute could be enacted 
unless it was approved in the same form by:  (1) the popularly elected 
House of Representatives; (2) the Senate, whose members were cho-
sen by state legislatures; and (3) the President, the national executive 
official.  The existence of these vetogates, each with a different elec-
toral constituency, gave some assurance to the politically relevant mi-
norities (i.e., property owners and the States themselves) that statutes 
burdening them would be subject to scrutiny in three differently con-
stituted bodies.  Madison famously argued that “[a]mbition must be 
made to counteract ambition,” by which he meant that separation of 
powers and federalism assured minorities of different situses for op-
posing partial and unjust laws.8  Deliberative politics at the state level 
was, theoretically, the promise of the Guarantee Clause in Article IV. 
Second, the Framers believed that the system of checks and bal-
ances would protect minorities.  The fact that statutory interpretation 
(Article III) and enforcement (Article II) were in the hands of offi-
cials different from those creating the statutory duties had two vir-
tues.  One was that law application by different institutions created 
incentives for legislators to adopt wise and temperate laws, as burden-
some discriminatory statutes could be turned against the groups 
sponsoring them.  Another virtue was that the judiciary would directly 
nullify “unjust and partial laws”9 through narrow interpretation or 
 
 6 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in 2 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 183, 186 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901) (1785). 
 7 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 470. 
 8 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 322. 
 9 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 470. 
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even constitutional invalidation.  Following that idea, nineteenth cen-
tury state judges developed a jurisprudence trimming back and some-
times invalidating “partial” laws applying “special” benefits or obliga-
tions on certain groups.10  Although not as important as the structural 
protection, the Constitution also contained a few specific protections, 
chiefly the bar to bills of attainder by both federal and state legisla-
tures.11 
Third, the Framers believed that the constitutional structure would 
help ensure the perseverance of liberty for all groups.  The vetogates 
implicated in Article I, Section 7 meant that it would be very hard for 
the federal government to create new legal burdens without signifi-
cant public need.  As Hamilton emphasized, the judiciary would pro-
vide a neutrality that would reassure minorities—especially landown-
ers, merchants, and minority religions—that they could not be 
unfairly burdened.12  Madison’s emphasis was federalism:  the exis-
tence of state centers of power would provide a “double security” for 
everyone’s liberty and keep the national Congress honest.13 
B.  The Bill of Rights, 1791 
Opponents of the Constitution maintained that the structural pro-
tections extolled by Madison and Hamilton were insufficient to pro-
tect minorities against unfair or even persecutory legislation.  Their 
arguments had enough traction to impel Federalists supporting the 
Constitution to promise supplementation of the Constitution with 
rights-conferring provisions.  True to their word, the Federalists de-
livered on their promise with the Bill of Rights, which was ratified by 
the States by 1791.  Their rights-conferring strategy reaffirmed and 
deepened the Framers’ original pluralism-facilitating ideas, discussed 
above.14 
 
 10 See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 245, 247 (1997) (noting that state courts adopted a doctrine against partial or spe-
cial laws).  Some early state constitutions had explicit assurances along these lines.  E.g., 
PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I (Declaration of Rights), § V (“[G]overnment is, or ought to be, 
instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or 
community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, fam-
ily, or sett [sic] of men, who are a part only of that community . . . .”). 
 11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (barring Congress from enacting bills of attainder); U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (outlining a similar bar applicable to state legislatures, but also 
including ex post facto laws and bills creating titles of nobility). 
 12 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 469. 
 13 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 323. 
 14 On the regime created by the Bill of Rights, see generally AKHIL R. AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY (2005); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 
100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991). 
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The authors and ratifiers of these first ten amendments fully ac-
cepted the Constitution’s premises that public policy is created pri-
marily through statutes adopted by the people’s elected representa-
tives in the legislature and that all salient groups would be 
encouraged to take their fights and their agendas into the arena of 
legislative politics.  Likewise, they accepted the three precepts above 
for protecting minority interests, but supplemented the Constitu-
tion’s structural strategy for assuring a healthy pluralism with a rights 
strategy; their expectation, of course, was that the two strategies 
would be mutually reinforcing. 
First, the Framers of the Bill of Rights created explicit rights allow-
ing citizens to mobilize themselves politically, and thereby have an in-
fluence on legislative and other government deliberations contem-
plated by Article I, Section 7 and the Guarantee Clause.  This was an 
important, and perhaps the primary, inspiration for the First 
Amendment’s protections for free speech, petitioning the govern-
ment, and freedom of assembly.15  Hence, the deliberation entailed in 
republican law creation would be informed by popular input and 
feedback.  The Supreme Court has also interpreted the Second 
Amendment as protecting an individual’s right to bear arms, in part 
as an insurance against oppressive legislation.16 
Second, the Framers of the Bill of Rights provided explicit rights-
conferring protections for minorities against discriminatory statutes 
or implementation.  Recall that, for these Framers, the most salient 
“minorities” were creditors, property owners, and religious minori-
ties.  Creditors and property owners were subject to confiscatory stat-
utes, and the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment was a protec-
tion for their interests:  their property could not be taken except for a 
“public use” and must be accompanied by just compensation.  Reli-
gious minorities, the objects of the most stakes-raising politics in Eu-
rope and England in the early modern period, were the beneficiaries 
of the Constitution’s first elaborate minority-protection scheme:  the 
Free Exercise Clause barred the federal government from persecut-
ing religious minorities, and the Anti-Establishment Clause barred 
the federal government from creating a state religion such as the 
 
 15 Although not a work of history, for the best statement of the First Amendment, see 
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). 
 16 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789 (2008) (explicating the Second 
Amendment’s history to support the notion that an armed citizenry was an important as-
surance of popular liberties against government oppression). 
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Church of England, which could force minorities to support a relig-
ion they found odious.17 
Third, the Bill of Rights expanded the Constitution’s libertarian 
protections with an enforceable Due Process Clause in the Fifth 
Amendment (which, like the other provisions, only applied to the 
federal government).  That provision has traditionally been read to 
assure minority persons a fair hearing before an impartial judge be-
fore the State could deprive them of life, liberty, or property.  If the 
federal government went after such persons in a criminal proceeding, 
the rights protections of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Amendments kicked in, making it much more difficult for the federal 
government to invoke the State’s most serious sanctions in these cir-
cumstances. 
C.  Reconstruction Amendments, 1866–1871 
In the two generations between the Constitution of 1789 and Re-
construction, the United States changed dramatically.  The biggest 
social change was the creation of a potentially important new social 
group—namely, the slaves, who were freed by the Emancipation 
Proclamation (1863) and the Thirteenth Amendment (1866).  The 
Reconstruction Framers believed that these new African American 
citizens would immediately be subject to discrimination and even 
persecution by former slave States.  Thus, the immediate purpose of 
the Reconstruction Amendments was pluralistic:  to integrate citizens 
of color into the body politic and head off the tendency of the former 
slave States to go after citizens of color with “partial and unjust laws” 
that would have made Hamilton blanch.18 
Early drafts of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly focused on 
the freed slaves or racial minorities, but none of these drafts gained 
enough political traction to advance in Congress.  Instead, the text 
that Congress sent to the States for ratification was non-raced; its pro-
visions were phrased generally, and the expectation of the Framers 
was that their individual rights protections would not be limited to 
 
 17 For a general discussion along these lines, see ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A 
NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE 
RELIGION CLAUSES (1990). 
 18 On the politics of the Abolitionists and their connection with the Reconstruction 
Amendments, see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE:  THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT:  FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988); JACOBUS 
TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951). 
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persons of color.19  More important, the Reconstruction Framers saw 
themselves as elaborating upon the already-existing constitutional 
structure and expanding it to protect a new cluster of social groups 
against state, and not just federal, oppression.  Unlike the 1789 and 
1791 Framers, the Reconstruction Framers were not focused on 
property-owning or religious minorities, whose protection they took 
for granted; they wanted to extend the Constitution to protect the 
new African American citizens against the southern Black Codes that 
threatened to reduce them to slave status despite the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s restrictions on doing so.  The class legislation focus 
was not limited to the Black Codes and theoretically included any 
kind of law that took rights or property from Group A to benefit 
Group B without any serious advancement of the public interest.20 
As the Bill of Rights had done in 1791, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of 1868 created rights-based protections that contributed to the 
constitutional project of supporting pluralist democracy by ensuring 
deliberation involving a variety of groups, protecting minorities 
against majority overreaching, and guaranteeing core liberties against 
rash invasion. 
First, the Reconstruction Amendments gave bite to the participa-
tory precept underlying the unenforceable Guarantee Clause.  Ac-
cordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment barred the States from deny-
ing certain “privileges or immunities” to their own citizens.  The 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was probably intended to extend the 
First Amendment protections for free speech and press, assembly and 
petition, and religious freedom to the States.21  The Fifteenth 
Amendment, barring the States from denying citizens the vote on ac-
count of race, was meant to head off the likely effort of southern 
States to close off their legislatures from the influence of the freed 
slaves. 
Second, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment imposed a new equality obligation upon the States.  What was 
the nature of that obligation?  Senator Jacob Howard (who intro-
duced the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate) said that the pur-
 
 19 Saunders, supra note 10, at 276–85 (tracing the drafting history of the proposed Four-
teenth Amendment, from early drafts focusing on race to the more generally phrased 
drafts that formed the basis for the amendment ultimately proposed by Congress). 
 20 NELSON, supra note 18, at 176–78; Saunders, supra note 10, at 271–93. 
 21 See Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise:  Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court 
and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1051, 1081–82 (2000) (proposing a reassessment of history to determine whether and to 
what extent the Fourteenth Amendment applies the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to 
the States).  To be sure, the matter remains much disputed. 
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pose of the Equal Protection Clause was to abolish “all class legisla-
tion in the States and do[] away with the injustice of subjecting one 
caste of persons to a code not applicable to another.”22  This view was 
widely shared among the sponsors and supporters of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in both Congress and the ratifying legislatures.23  Such a 
purpose went beyond race-based class legislation, but the 1868 Fram-
ers were not precise, and probably not of one mind, in laying out 
precisely what the language permitted and what it prohibited.24 
Third, the Due Process Clause expanded the libertarian/neutrality 
precept to state governments.  (Recall that the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause applied only to the federal government.)  Sena-
tor Howard’s class legislation idea was also linked to the Due Process 
Clause, partly because the notion of a neutral rule of law is naturally 
akin to an aversion to special legislation, and partly because some 
state court judges based their class legislation cases on state due 
process clauses.25 
 
 22 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard); accord 
id. at 174 (statement of Rep. James Wilson) (stating that in republican government, there 
can be “no class legislation” and no laws that “legislate against [one class] . . . for the pur-
pose of advancing the interests” of another class). 
 23 See Saunders, supra note 10, at 285–93 (examining in detail both congressional and ratifi-
cation debates supporting the idea that the core goal of the Equal Protection Clause was 
to codify the antebellum state cases invalidating special and partial laws). 
 24 On the confusion of the 1868 Framers’ expectations, see NELSON, supra note 18, at 176–
78. 
 25 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard) (an-
nouncing the no-class-legislation principle as reflected in the latter two clauses of Sec-
tion 1); Saunders, supra note 10, at 286–87. 
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TABLE 1.  THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTION AND PLURALISM 
Value Constitution 
of 1789 
Bill of 
Rights, 1791 
Reconstruc-
tion Amend-
ments, 1866–
71 
Participation 
and  
Deliberation 
Guarantee 
Clause, art. IV; 
Bicameralism & 
Presentment, 
art. I, § 7 
Free Speech, 
etc., I Amend.;
Armed Citizens, 
II Amend.;  
Jury, VI–VIII 
Amends. 
Privileges or 
Immunities 
Clause, 
XIV Amend.; 
Right to Vote, 
XV Amend. 
Minority 
Protection 
Separation of 
Powers; 
Federalism; 
No Bills of 
Attainder 
Religion 
Clauses,  
I Amend.; 
Takings Clause,
 V Amend. 
No Involuntary 
Servitude, 
XIII Amend.; 
Equal Protection 
Clause, 
XIV Amend. 
Libertarian 
Neutrality 
Independent 
Judiciary, 
art. III, § 1 
Due Process 
Clause, 
V Amend; 
Criminal 
Procedure, 
IV, V, VI & VII 
Amends. 
Due Process 
Clause, 
XIV Amend. 
 
Table 1 maps the Constitution’s pluralism-facilitating provisions.  
Note that the constitutional guarantees expanded along three di-
mensions:  from structural protections to inclusion of rights-
conferring provisions; from particular rights (such as religion) to 
more generalized rights statements; and from guarantees applicable 
solely to the federal government to those applicable to the States.  As 
the sociology of groups changed, and as the American experience 
developed, the Constitution expanded.  Its expansion was sedimen-
tary, as the old protections remained even as new protections were 
added.  This Article only focuses on the minority protection provi-
sions, and the Equal Protection Clause in particular, but this part of 
the Constitution needs to be understood in light of the larger consti-
tutional picture. 
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My argument is that the Fourteenth Amendment updated and 
generalized the pluralism-protective features of the Constitution.  
Specifically, constitutionalizing the no-class-legislation principle of 
the Jackson era, the Equal Protection Clause sets boundaries on the 
dynamic process of lawmaking to assure that it will be pluralism-
facilitating.  The meta-purpose of constitutional equality protections 
is to encourage both established and emerging groups to want to par-
ticipate in the democratic political process and not want to drop out. 
II.  A PLURALISM-FACILITATING THEORY OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
REVIEW 
This Part moves from the structural constitutional history exam-
ined above to a workable and realistic theory relating the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and constitutional history to the relationship between 
government and social groups.  The constitutional history, including 
notions grounded upon original meaning, plays three important 
roles in my theory.  First, the history provides a conceptual purpose 
for the Equal Protection Clause:  the bar to “class legislation.”  What 
does that mean, as applied to modern circumstances?  This is obvi-
ously a harder project, but the difficulty is an inevitable one and so 
cannot be ignored or facilely glossed over.  My theory for developing 
the consequences of the no-class-legislation purpose of the Equal 
Protection Clause rests upon the pluralistic meta-purpose of the Con-
stitution itself:  the State must provide security for all salient social 
groups and must provide a sufficient incentive for all such groups to 
advance their agendas within the forums provided by the State.26 
Second, the history provides three different, and mutually rein-
forcing, constitutional corollaries that help assure conditions condu-
cive to a flourishing democratic pluralism:  open deliberation where a 
wide variety of groups participate, a presumption of equal treatment 
and minority protection, and neutrality with a libertarian bias.  Struc-
turally, therefore, I read the Fourteenth Amendment not only in light 
of its generative debates, but also in light of the Constitution’s longer 
history.  I would link the Equal Protection Clause not only with Re-
construction’s larger project of integrating citizens of color into 
American politics, but also with the Bill of Rights’ project of respect-
ing religious pluralism through both a free exercise right and an anti-
establishment norm.  Reasoning by analogy from the Religion Claus-
 
 26 For background, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust:  How Courts Can Sup-
port Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279 (2005). 
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es as well as the anti-Black Code feature of the Equal Protection 
Clause provides a law-based mechanism for applying the generally 
phrased latter clause to other groups. 
Third, the history suggests anchors that can be starting points for 
the process of reasoning by historical analogy to modern circum-
stances.  Accordingly, my theory understands equal protection play-
ing different roles depending upon the status of the social group.  A 
pluralistic democracy enjoys a dynamic relationship with social 
groups, which are themselves evolving.  I focus on the important plu-
ralist phenomenon of social groups that go through the following cy-
cle, from:  (1) irrelevance, when society views their defining traits as 
malignant variations from the norm; to (2) visibility but marginality, 
when society views their defining traits as tolerable but inferior varia-
tions from the norm; to (3) full participation, when society views 
their variations as benign and there is no single norm.  Each stage in 
the cycle provides a background norm against which the no-class-
legislation principle can be applied.  History provides examples the 
Framers considered core illustrations of the no-class-legislation prin-
ciple, and these examples enable us to reason by analogy to modern 
circumstances. 
Reading the no-class-legislation purpose through the lens of plu-
ralist theory generates the following rough typology for applying the 
Equal Protection Clause to new and unforeseen cases: 
• State distinctions will not be class legislation if they reflect a 
natural distinction whose legal recognition serves the public in-
terest.  Thus, the 1868 Framers did not consider women to be a 
politically relevant group, even though many women themselves 
objected to that understanding.27  The general idea is that where 
there is no socially recognized, and pluralistically important, 
group penalized by state distinctions, there is little work for the 
Equal Protection Clause to do.  Following the Framers, the Su-
preme Court for generations treated statutory sex discrimina-
tions as not presenting strong equal protection concerns. 
• The no-class-legislation principle has much more bite once a 
group is accepted as politically relevant, even if it remains so-
cially marginal.  This was precisely the status of the freed slaves; 
even most Republicans believed that black citizens were inferior 
to white citizens.  But the goal of Reconstruction was to inte-
 
 27 See Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon:  Woman Suffragists and the “Living Constitution,” 
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456, 1475 (2001) (noting women’s rights groups’ opposition to the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
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grate these new citizens into American politics, and the Equal 
Protection Clause contributed to that purpose by legitimizing 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and overriding the Black Codes.  Al-
though the Framers decidedly felt that law could reflect race-
based distinctions, such as the remedial program of the Freed-
man’s Bureau, they wanted to override any such race legislation 
that entrenched black citizens as a subordinate caste.28  The 
general idea is that a marginal but politically relevant group 
must be tolerated and cannot be subject to legislation that seeks 
to entrench an outcaste status for that group. 
• The no-class-legislation principle has the most bite for minority 
groups that have become socially accepted participants in our 
pluralist democracy; this was the goal for African Americans in 
the twentieth century.  This was more or less the status of mi-
nority religions in 1868, and the Framers intended the Four-
teenth Amendment to apply the Religion Clauses to the States.  
Where the public law background norm was benign variation, as 
it was for religion, the State could not openly discriminate at all.  
My suggestion is that, for a minority group fully accepted in the 
pluralist heaven, the no-class-legislation principle merges into 
the free exercise and anti-establishment principles.  Precisely, 
legislation penalizing a salient group in favor of the majority is 
class legislation in the free exercise sense, while legislation pro-
viding special benefits for the majority group alone is class legis-
lation in the establishment sense. 
Consider these stages of a group’s normative status in our polity in 
greater detail; in the course of discussion, I shall use sexual minorities 
as a template for applying these basic ideas.29 
A.  Stage One:  Libertarian and Deliberation-Participatory Protections 
Anybody can announce himself a member of a group, and Ameri-
cans can be classified, and self-classified, in myriad ways.  The Fram-
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as those of the Bill of 
Rights, did not understand their protections as applying to any con-
ceivable “class” of Americans; my theory identifies a limiting princi-
 
 28 See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
71 VA. L. REV. 753, 755 (1985) (noting that Congress rejected various race limitations in 
social welfare programs). 
 29 For a more comprehensive look at how the law treats sexual minorities, see WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW:  CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999) [hereinafter 
ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW], and WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS:  SODOMY 
LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861–2003 (2008) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS]. 
1252 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:5 
 
ple.  In policing “special” or “partial” legislation, the Equal Protection 
Clause ought to focus on groups that are socially and politically rele-
vant as players in our democratic-pluralist politics.  A social group is 
not politically relevant when society understands its defining trait to 
be a malignant variation.  Just as alcoholics and child molesters are 
politically irrelevant today (they might be understood as “groups” but 
are not recognized political players), so were cross-dressers and “de-
generates” (later called “inverts” or “perverts” or “sexual variants”) in 
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.  Putting it an-
other way, degenerates et al. were considered regulatory objects and 
not subjects by those who held power in 1868, just as those who hold 
power today do not consider alcoholics a legitimate social group that 
is a legitimate player in the pluralist political process.  Hence, legisla-
tion singling out “degenerates” or “perverts” for sterilization, as a 
number of jurisdictions did in the early twentieth century, did not in 
that period (as in 1868) mobilize serious equal protection concerns.30 
The Equal Protection Clause is concerned with politically relevant 
groups, and so its bite is going to be weak for persons who are not 
members of a recognized group—but that does not mean that out-
casts from politics do not concern a pluralist theory of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Quite the contrary, as the 1789, 1791, and 1868 Fram-
ers all recognized, a source of the dynamism of pluralist politics is the 
emergence of new politically salient groups.  Pluralist theory de-
mands that the State remain neutral and open to the emergence and 
salience of new social groups, and the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects this process at the state level. 
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment insists that the State provide 
“due process” to all persons, however squalid society deems them to 
be.  A social leper in 1868 (the degenerate) may be part of a thriving 
and widely accepted social group in 2009 (the gay community).  A 
State that imprisons and executes a social pariah without evidence of 
serious wrongdoing, with evidence procured through illegal means, 
without allowing the person to cross-examine witnesses against him, 
or through a corrupt process where the decisionmakers prejudged 
his guilt because of his pariah status, is no better than a dictatorship 
and is antithetical to the Constitution generally and the Due Process 
Clauses in particular.  Due process reflects the Constitution’s libertar-
ian bias, and it is a bias that applies to the squalid miscreant, the in-
nocent outsider, and the respectable citizen alike. 
 
 30 E.g., 1909 Cal. Stat. 1093–94 (permitting the sterilization of “moral and sexual per-
vert[s]”). 
July 2009] A PLURALIST THEORY 1253 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment has also been read to guarantee pa-
riahs something more positive, namely, the right to protest their sta-
tus, to publish materials seeking tolerance from the majority, and to 
form political groups to seek legal changes through legislation, ad-
ministrative change, and so forth.31  While nine pariahs out of ten 
may be usefully treated as marginal, the tenth one may be the germ 
of a group to come—and it is imperative that the State induce all ten 
pariahs to make their case within the pluralist system rather than go-
ing underground or otherwise moving outside of the system. 
Although the Equal Protection Clause provided no protection 
(equal or otherwise) for degenerate, inverted, perverted, or homo-
sexual Americans for most of our history, even these despised and 
feared persons enjoyed significant constitutional protections against 
government oppression.  For a dramatic example, between 1946 and 
1961, state and federal governments created an anti-homosexual re-
gime that precisely paralleled the one created by Nazi Germany in 
the previous period (1933–1945)—yet America’s anti-homosexual 
Kulturkampf never became a Nazi-like Holocaust (a mass imprison-
ment, torture, and extermination of homosexuals as well as Jews and 
gypsies), in part because of the recognized constitutional due process 
and free speech protections enjoyed even by accused homosexuals.32  
This is to be celebrated not just for humanistic reasons, but also for 
pluralism-based reasons:  a persecutorial society is one that invites in-
ternal corruption, undermines opportunities for social cooperation, 
and creates political anger and dangers of retaliation. 
B.  Stage Two:  No Class Legislation (Narrow Sweep) 
The admonition against class legislation has some bite for social 
groups that are junior partners in America’s great and (after 1850) 
rapidly expanding pluralist pantheon.  By junior partners, I mean 
that the minority has emerged as a coherent social group, and the 
 
 31 The protections in text were originally understood as falling within the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. 
Jacob Howard) (noting the amendment “relates to the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens”), but the Supreme Court relocated these protections into the Due Process Clause.  
E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (applying the First Amendment to the 
States under the aegis of the Due Process Clause). 
 32 See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 29, at 57–97 (discussing “how post-World War II Ameri-
can law went much further than prewar law to suppress gay subculture and how antigay 
Kulturkampf (state war of subcultural suppression) contributed to the closet”).  See gener-
ally Richard A. Posner, Ask, Tell, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 11, 1999, at 52 (analyzing Eskridge’s 
account of “gaylaw,” the law’s treatment of homosexuals and other “gender nonconform-
ists,” in the book, GAYLAW:  CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET, supra note 29). 
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majority considers the group’s trait to be a tolerable and not malig-
nant variation.  This was the normative step taken for blacks by Re-
construction; even Republicans who harbored racist views that blacks 
were inferior to whites believed that racial variation was tolerable and 
ought not be the basis for class legislation suppressing blacks.  Like-
wise, “homosexuals” evolved into “gays” in large northern cities in the 
1960s and 1970s, but it was not until the 1990s that most Americans 
came to view homosexuality as a tolerable (but still icky) variation 
from the norm. 
From a pluralist perspective, the emergence of a new social group 
clamoring for inclusion in ordinary politics is occasion for both cele-
bration and concern.  That gay people took their case for decent 
treatment to local and state legislatures and judges is exactly what 
makes pluralist democracy a great engine for adjusting politics to new 
social dynamics.  And the success of gay people sends an affirming 
signal to the next social groups.  But even as established groups are 
forced to deal with the new one, they can be expected to push back 
and reassert traditional statuses in the face of new challenges.  Some-
times the majority groups push back too hard.  Where should the line 
be drawn?  In retrospect, most of us now believe that the first Justice 
Harlan, rather than the Court, got the line right in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
for example.33  A regime that thoroughly segregated blacks from 
whites was class legislation even if one believed, as Harlan did, that 
blacks were an inferior race:  the fates of the different races are 
linked, and apartheid not only fueled race-based animosity, but also 
impeded cooperation and useful interaction among persons of dif-
ferent races.34 
For a more recent example, the response of America’s most tradi-
tionalist States to the emerging gay social group was to reaffirm the 
notion that sodomy is a serious offense against society and should be 
the basis for civil as well as criminal disabilities—but traditionalists 
created a new crime of “homosexual” and not heterosexual sodomy, 
lest their project affect married and other heterosexual Americans 
who practice oral or anal sex.  Hence, the Supreme Court in Bowers v. 
Hardwick suggested (in the context of a completely nondiscriminatory 
sodomy law) that the State could certainly criminalize homosexual, 
 
 33 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 34 See id. at 557–59 (objecting to the Court’s ratification of segregated railroad travel and 
arguing that a forced separation of the races is bad politics because the fates of the two 
races are interlinked). 
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but probably not heterosexual, sodomy.35  The Court seventeen years 
later overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas based upon a sea change in 
America’s pluralist landscape36:  by 2003, gay people had graduated 
from utter pariahs to a nervously accepted social group, and the 
Court required Texas to follow the new consensus.  Although it was 
characterized as a due process opinion, Lawrence also exploited the 
core goal of the Equal Protection Clause:  the State cannot subject a 
thriving social group to a network of legal exclusions and discrimina-
tions that push its members outside the normal channels of politics.37 
An earlier Supreme Court case also illustrates this precept.  In 
Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down a Colorado constitutional 
amendment that, read literally, sought not only to revoke anti-
discrimination laws protecting gay people, but also to deny gay peo-
ple ordinary protections against mistreatment by the State.38  The 
Colorado amendment echoed our country’s lengthy history of perva-
sive discrimination against, and violence toward, gay people—a link 
the Court sought to disrupt.  Correctly reading American political 
culture to have moved from hostility as regards to “homosexuals,” to-
ward a culture of tolerance, the Court essentially ruled that the 
amendment was a queer version of the old Black Codes:  an effort by 
family values conservatives to consign “homosexuals” to be a perma-
nent underclass.39  Dissenting Justices made the logical point that this 
reading of equal protection was inconsistent with Bowers, a notion the 
Court followed seven years later when it formally overruled Bowers.40 
Other pluralism-protecting Supreme Court decisions support my 
notion that the “class legislation” concern of the Equal Protection 
Clause has been, and should be, read through the lens of democratic 
pluralism.  A harbinger of Romer was the Court’s decision in City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., which invalidated the applica-
tion of a zoning ordinance to close down a home for mentally dis-
abled persons.41  Pluralism-monitoring is on the face of the Court’s 
 
 35 478 U.S. 186 (1985).  Bowers was analyzed in detail by ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, 
supra note 29, at ch. 8. 
 36 539 U.S. 558, 559–60 (2003). 
 37 Id. at 574–75 (recognizing the equal protection claim as tenable and closely linked to the 
Court’s own privacy analysis); id. at 579–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(invalidating the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law solely on equal protection grounds). 
 38 517 U.S. 620, 630 (1996).  But see id. at 636–38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (strongly disputing 
the majority’s understanding of the Amendment 2’s plain meaning).  See generally 
ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 29, at ch. 9 (analyzing the Supreme 
Court’s “regime-shifting” opinion in Romer v. Evans). 
 39 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 630–35 (majority opinion). 
 40 Id. at 636–51 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 41 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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opinion, which recognized people with disabilities as a social group 
that state and federal legislatures had recognized as a worthy part of 
society, but without insisting upon completely equal treatment, be-
cause the identifying trait was one that did often bear on one’s capac-
ity for participation in politics, governance, and society.42  Nonethe-
less, the city’s harsh application of its zoning law struck the Court as 
having no relationship to legitimate public policy concerns and was, 
instead, a state implementation of private “prejudice.”43  Cleburne 
stands for the proposition that any law targeting a salient social group 
because of prejudice is class legislation unacceptable under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Another example of class legislation is the Texas law struck down 
in Plyler v. Doe.44  The law barred children of illegal aliens from receiv-
ing public education in the State.45  Although the law may have re-
flected prejudice, like the laws later invalidated in Cleburne and Romer, 
the Court found particularly troubling the promise that such a law 
would create a permanent “underclass” of young people (many of 
whom were themselves citizens, because they were born here) denied 
education and engagement in American society.46  There were plenty 
of ways Texas could discriminate against illegal aliens, but excluding 
the next generation of Americans (no longer “aliens”) from our cul-
ture is exactly the wrong way to discriminate.  Again, the permanent 
subordination of a potentially thriving social group might have re-
minded some of the Justices of the Reconstruction-era Black Codes. 
C.  Stage Three:  No Class Legislation (Broader Sweep) 
Gay people, persons with disabilities, and aliens as well as their 
children are important social groups that the Equal Protection Clause 
will sometimes protect, but most Americans still consider their varia-
tion from the norm at best tolerable, and far from benign or completely 
normal.  Most parents, for example, would be strongly disappointed, 
and some would be hysterical, if their beloved daughter decided to 
marry a lesbian, a disabled person, or the offspring of an (illegal) 
alien.  Advocates for such minority social groups want to persuade 
those Americans that they are wrong:  the lesbian, the differently ab-
 
 42 See id. at 442–46. 
 43 Id. at 446–50; accord id. at 451–55 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing for a sliding-scale ap-
proach to equal protection). 
 44 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 45 Id. at 205. 
 46 Id. at 219–20; accord id. at 236–42 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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led, or the progeny of an illegal visitor can be just as good a spouse as 
the heterosexual, the fully able, or the progeny of a legal citizen.  In-
deed, such a person might actually be the very best spouse for this 
particular daughter. 
None of these groups has yet persuaded Middle America of such 
normative claims, but other groups have been successful.  The civil 
rights and the women’s rights movements have persuaded Americans 
that race and gender variation are benign and not just tolerable; race 
or (usually) sex has no bearing on one’s ability to participate in the 
workplace and other forums.  Once their fellow Americans accepted 
that proposition, and the former out-group became a political in-
group, the no-class-legislation principle demanded more than it did 
in Romer, Cleburne, and Plyler.  Once women and people of color as-
sumed roles as salient social groups whose voices matter in America, 
then any law that formally discriminates against those groups de-
mands serious judicial scrutiny, as potential class legislation that takes 
rights or property from one group to another without a sufficient jus-
tification in the public interest.  Justices engage in intense debates 
about what public interests justify sex or, especially, race classifica-
tions, but they are in accord that the State must advance strong justi-
fications.47 
The normative migration of a group’s trait from tolerable to be-
nign status is a movement the Supreme Court can easily detect and 
has done so in earlier regime shifts.  Although opinion polls can be 
useful confirmatory evidence, the usual barometer for a judicial au-
dience is and ought to be widespread adoption of statutes to that ef-
fect.  The adoption of statutes not only confirms the status of the 
group as a normal player in the pluralist political arena, but also sug-
gests that the group has persuaded super-majorities of their claims to 
full participation and respect.  Thus, the discrediting of race as a le-
gitimate classification culminated in Loving v. Virginia, where the 
Court struck down state laws barring different-race marriages.48  Al-
though Americans today regard Loving as a constitutional gimme, it 
was in fact rendered so only after Congress had adopted anti-
discrimination super-statutes in 1964 (the Civil Rights Act) and 1965 
(the Voting Rights Act), and all the States outside the South had re-
 
 47 E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that government racial classifica-
tions must be analyzed by reviewing courts under strict scrutiny to evaluate the validity of 
the government’s use of race in a certain context); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 
531 (1996) (holding that the government must demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” to defend sex discrimination). 
 48 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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pealed their own anti-miscegenation laws.49  Likewise, feminists won 
heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications only after they had 
revealed their political muscle in a series of anti-discrimination laws 
adopted by Congress in 1964 and 1972.50 
You do not need opinion polls to know that there has not been 
such a normative shift as regards homosexuality or even physical dis-
ability.  Most States still do not have anti-discrimination laws that in-
clude sexual orientation, and the laws that protect the disabled (such 
as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990) allow discrimination 
for various social and business justifications.51  Under a pluralist-
facilitating theory, it would be a mistake for the Supreme Court to 
consider these traits to be suspect classifications.  Homosexuality will 
in the foreseeable future likely be a trait that most Americans will 
consider benign as a matter of public policy.  And when that day 
comes, there will be a federal anti-discrimination law, as well as simi-
lar policies at the state level.  If that happens, the Supreme Court will 
sweep away the remaining anti-homosexual discriminations. 
Table 2 below maps out the constitutional rights practically avail-
able to different social groups (categorized according to the norma-
tive acceptability of a defining trait). 
 
 49 See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES:  SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 
244–80 (2003) (detailing the repeal of and attack on antimiscegenation laws in the Unit-
ed States). 
 50 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (arguing 
for strict scrutiny for sex discrimination, based upon congressional legislation announc-
ing that such discrimination ought to be illegitimate in our modern pluralistic democ-
racy); JO FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION:  A CASE STUDY OF AN 
EMERGING SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND ITS RELATION TO THE POLICY PROCESS 202–04 (1975) 
(noting 1971–72 as an annus mirabilis for the Equal Rights Amendment and a series of 
important congressional sex discrimination statutes). 
 51 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE 
LAW (2d ed. 2004) (providing an analysis of sexual orientation discrimination laws and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
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TABLE 2.  THE DYNAMICS OF PLURALISM AND THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 
Status of 
Group in 
American 
Society 
Due Process 
Protection 
First 
Amendment 
Protection 
Equal 
Protection of 
the Law 
Marginal 
(trait a 
malignant 
variation)  
Criminal 
procedure 
important, 
as group 
members 
are targeted 
for criminal 
prosecution 
Potential First 
Amendment 
rights, albeit 
uneven 
judicial 
enforcement 
Little if any 
scrutiny under 
the Equal 
Protection 
Clause 
Emerging as 
Salient 
(tolerable 
variation)  
Criminal 
procedure 
protections 
+ Privacy 
rights 
Broad First 
Amendment 
rights, with ju-
dicial 
enforcement 
Anti-Caste Idea:  
Group cannot 
be rendered 
outlaws 
Fully 
Participating 
Group 
(benign 
variation) 
Criminal 
procedure 
protections 
+ Privacy 
rights 
Full First 
Amendment 
rights, with ju-
dicial 
enforcement 
sometimes 
against 
minorities 
Clean-Up:   
Courts will clear 
away 
discriminations  
not addressed 
by political 
process 
III.  DEFENSE AND APPLICATION OF A PLURALIST THEORY OF EQUAL 
PROTECTION 
A.  Virtues of a Pluralist Theory of Equal Protection 
I would claim three different kinds of virtues for the foregoing 
pluralist theory of groups and the Fourteenth Amendment:  rule of 
law, democratic theory, and practicality. 
To begin with, such a pluralist theory finds support in the evolving 
structure of the Constitution and in the original purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment itself, for the reasons suggested above.  Indeed, a 
pluralist theory has a better connection with structural and historical 
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constitutional materials than John Hart Ely’s more aggressive theory 
arguing that the Equal Protection Clause should protect “discrete 
and insular minorities.”52  Stated somewhat differently, a pluralism-
facilitating theory has the rule-of-law advantages of:  (1) carrying out 
the original purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment in a manner 
consistent with (2) the constitutional structure and (3) other com-
mitments of the constitutional deliberations, namely:  (a) pragma-
tism, or an avoidance of mechanical rules and adoption of an adap-
tive approach; (b) caution, or an aversion to giving federal judges a 
broad veto power over state legislation, and a deference to congres-
sional judgments; and (c) political functionality, or a devotion to an 
integrated United States where the stakes of politics do not get so 
high that they drive groups out of the system. 
In my view, a bigger advantage of pluralism-facilitating theory is 
that it is responsive to a huge problem faced by all democracies:  their 
fragility when the emotional stakes get too high.  Political scientists, 
ranging from Adam Przeworski to Stephen Holmes to Lani Guinier, 
warn us that pluralist democracy is fragile, in part because its stakes 
tend to get out of hand.53  Certain that they are right about the im-
portant issues of the day, reigning majorities have a tendency to cen-
sor opposing views, to create ambitious legal regimes of exclusion for 
some minorities they find obnoxious or distasteful, and to leave in 
place obsolescent discriminations.  These tendencies create unneces-
sary frictions in a pluralist democracy, and the theory outlined here 
provides a modest antidote to these destructive tendencies. 
Finally, pluralism-facilitating theory has a big advantage in that it 
helps explain the Court’s eclectic case law—going well beyond racial, 
ethnic, and religious minorities as the beneficiaries of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.  Specifically, the Court has invalidated laws that either 
seek to create, or have the potential effect of creating, new outcaste 
 
 52 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 76 (1980).  
For important critiques of Ely’s theory, see, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling 
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980), and Mark Tush-
net, Darkness on the Edge of Town:  The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 
89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980). 
 53 See GUINIER, supra note 3 (arguing that the winner-take-all approach to United States 
elections creates a “tyranny of the majority”); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND 
CONSTRAINT:  ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 202–08, 222–27 (1995) (discussing 
the importance of gag rules in liberal democracies); PRZEWORSKI, supra note 1, at 19, 36–
37 (“Some institutions under certain conditions offer to the relevant political forces a 
prospect of eventually advancing their interests that is sufficient to incite them to comply 
with immediately unfavorable outcomes.  Political forces comply with present defeats be-
cause they believe that the institutional framework that organizes the democratic compe-
tition will permit them to advance their interests in the future.”). 
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groups.  This explains the Court’s limited interventions in Plyler 
(children of illegal immigrants), Cleburne (people with disabilities), 
and Romer v. Evans (gay people).54  Indeed, this theory helps explain 
why the Court was right to reject a privacy argument for homosexual 
sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick while recognizing such a right in Law-
rence v. Texas.55  In the former case, the Court was properly reluctant 
to take the issue away from a volatile political process deeply skeptical 
of homosexuality, while the latter case gave the Court an opportunity 
to confirm the country’s regime shift away from treating homosexual-
ity as a malignant variation and toward treating it as a tolerable one.56 
My theory, or something like it, is probably the best explanation 
of the Court’s sex discrimination cases.  Today, the Court treats sex as 
a (quasi) suspect classification, and almost all sex discriminations 
have been invalidated.  This regime has virtually no support in the 
Constitution’s text and the original meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause, and is in some tension with the defeat of the Equal Rights 
Amendment.  It is also contrary to representation-reinforcement the-
ory, for women are neither a minority nor an insular group, and in-
deed their interests are well-represented in the political process.  
What justifies the Court’s jurisprudence is pluralist democracy:  wom-
en after 1945 have come to consider themselves a social group having 
common interests and have demanded fair treatment by the Ameri-
can government.  The Court did not take the lead in advancing wom-
en’s agenda of anti-discrimination laws, affirmative protections for vi-
olence against women, and family-supportive laws.  But once 
legislators and executive officials took the lead and public feedback 
supported those measures, then the Court swept away the primary 
atavisms of the earlier period, when a woman’s place was, legally as 
well as socially, in the home. 
For this last reason in particular, pluralism-facilitating theory ap-
peals to the Court’s own self-interest in ways that neither original 
meaning nor representation-reinforcing theories can honestly ac-
complish.  If the Court had upheld the dozens of sex-discriminatory 
laws it struck down in the 1970s, as dictated by original meaning or 
representation-reinforcing review, the Justices would have come un-
der tremendous fire and the Court’s institutional legitimacy would 
have taken a hit.  The reason would have been that most people 
 
 54 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 
U.S. 432 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 55 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 56 See ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 29, at ch. 10 (discussing sodomy law in 
the context of Lawrence v. Texas). 
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would have thought it obvious that the literal guarantee that no State 
shall deny “any person the equal protection of the laws” meant that 
women could not be forced by the State to change their names upon 
marriage, that women could not be excluded or even given an easy 
exit from jury service, and so forth.  More importantly, the Americans 
whose views on such issues were the most intense tended to be those 
who believed that such discriminations were core violations of their 
rights as citizens—while most Americans who supported those dis-
criminations felt less strongly.  In those circumstances, where the 
loudest voices would have condemned the Court and those suppor-
tive would have been muted or even silent, a string of decisions up-
holding blatant sex discriminations would have been a public rela-
tions disaster for the Court.  Even Bowers v. Hardwick suffered from 
this asymmetry, and a Court filled with conservative Republicans was 
eager to overrule it. 
Consider also how a pluralism-facilitating theory works in connec-
tion with several cutting-edge constitutional issues.  By and large, plu-
ralism-based theory urges caution on the part of the Supreme Court 
in equal protection cases. 
B.  Same-Sex Marriage 
There are many constitutional arguments for same-sex marriage, 
and I have written in favor of all of them as a matter of reasoning 
from Supreme Court precedent and from the original purpose of the 
Equal Protection Clause.57  I think these are persuasive arguments, yet 
for the most part they are better addressed to legislatures and state 
judges rather than to the United States Supreme Court.  The issue is 
far from ripe for Supreme Court review—and a nationwide judicially 
imposed requirement of marriage recognition would be a train wreck 
in a polity where Congress, almost all state legislatures, and dozens of 
state constitutions have legislated, repeatedly, that marriage is a un-
ion between one man and one woman.58 
The central idea of pluralist democracy, fully embedded in the 
Constitution, is the notion that elected representatives, accountable 
to the people, are the chief agents for making fundamental changes 
 
 57 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:  FROM SEXUAL 
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT, at chs. 5–6 (1996) (discussing the arguments in favor 
of same-sex marriage in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment and Loving v. Vir-
ginia). 
 58 For an up-to-date survey of state bars to same-sex marriage, see Lambda Legal’s website, 
Status of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/
articles/nationwide-status-same-sex-relationships.html (last visited May 8, 2009). 
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in public policy.  Recognizing same-sex marriages would be such a 
fundamental change, and it would be folly for judges to advance such 
a change without any legislative cooperation.  (The Clinton-era De-
fense of Marriage Act represented Congress’s and the President’s 
strong opposition to such a change.)  The central threat to pluralist 
democracy, indirectly recognized in the Constitution, is the possibility 
of the stakes being raised in ways that drive groups from politics; one 
way that the stakes of politics get too high is premature termination 
of public debate about an issue of deep concern to different groups.  
Given today’s public opinion, judicial recognition of same-sex mar-
riage would immediately raise the stakes of politics because it would 
effectively frustrate the successful efforts of traditional family values 
of Americans who seek to protect their old-fashioned understanding 
of marriage against modernization (and, in their view, degradation).  
Constitutionalizing the right prematurely would radicalize many of 
these Americans.  Unless, of course, they were able to secure a consti-
tutional amendment barring same-sex marriage—and then gay-
friendly America would be embittered and radicalized. 
The best argument for same-sex marriage under my theory is this 
one:  because civil marriage entails hundreds of related legal duties 
and rights, the exclusion of lesbian and gay couples from this legal 
institution discriminates against those couples as regards to hundreds 
of rights and duties.  Is this class legislation the core objective of the 
Equal Protection Clause’s searching scrutiny?  In my view, no.  To be-
gin with, most of the legal incidents of marriage can be created by 
contract, including support and fidelity obligations, inheritance 
rights, power of attorney, decision-making rights in the event of a 
partner’s injury or death, joint ownership of property, and so forth.  
Civil marriage provides all these rights and duties without the need 
for private contracting, which is usually a great advantage, but as a 
formal matter of law, a large majority of the incidents of marriage are 
available to lesbian and gay couples. 
By the way, a generation ago many States denied enforcement of 
contracts and wills involving lesbian and gay couples, usually because 
their relationship was founded on felonious sodomy.59  Now that the 
Supreme Court has swept away consensual sodomy laws, and estab-
lished tolerable sexual variation as the constitutional floor, this old 
regime has disappeared as a matter of open state policy.  If there are 
 
 59 E.g., Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 
225 (1981) (arguing that a homosexual testator bequeathing to his lover has a greater 
risk of having his testamentary plans overturned after death than a heterosexual testator 
giving to a spouse). 
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States that still effectively deny lesbian and gay people basic rights of 
inheritance, joint property ownership, and contracting, then a plural-
ism-facilitating theory strongly supports equal protection claims.  The 
Equal Protection Clause was adopted, at the very least, to assure that 
state as well as federal courts are available for ordinary contract and 
property claims. 
There are some rights that cannot be created by contract, such as 
the right of the surviving partner to sue for her own injuries in tort 
cases, but they are many fewer than the former group.  It is notable 
that (as of May 2009) eleven States and the District of Columbia pro-
vide most of these noncontractable rights to lesbian and gay couples, 
through statewide marriage, civil unions, or domestic partnership.  
All but one of these States are in the Northeast and West Coast por-
tions of our country, the two regions where our polity has moved to-
ward the norm that homosexuality is a benign variation and there is 
no single norm for sexuality.60  A pluralism-facilitating theory of those 
state constitutions would support a claim that the State must provide 
some legal institution for lesbian and gay couples.61 
But for the nation as a whole, a pluralism-facilitating theory insists 
upon a wide berth for public deliberation.  So long as this identity-
invested issue divides the country both intensely and evenly, there 
should be no national resolution.62  And there should be constitu-
tional tolerance for a variety of alternatives, such as civil unions.  Are 
these not, critics maintain, just like apartheid, a “separate but equal” 
regime fundamentally at odds with the Equal Protection Clause, es-
pecially as construed in Romer?63  From a pluralism perspective, that is 
an absurd argument.  Apartheid was a regime of strict separation of 
the races, generated by prejudice and enforced with violence.  Civil 
unions are a huge step toward integration of lesbian and gay couples 
into the larger polity, not a separation.  Indeed, civil unions and do-
mestic partnerships are a kind of “equality practice” that helps pre-
pare the way for normalization of homosexuality in polities that have 
 
 60 Lambda Legal, supra note 58. 
 61 E.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (requiring the legislature to create an institu-
tional form to provide lesbian and gay couples with the legal incidents of marriage, but 
not necessarily the name). 
 62 See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 93–99 (expanded ed. 1956) (ar-
guing that a “polyarchy” needs to minimize situations where big issues divide the polity 
both evenly and intensely). 
 63 See MICHAEL MELLO, LEGALIZING GAY MARRIAGE (2004) (arguing, by an openly straight 
author, that civil unions are an unacceptable “separate but equal” regime). 
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adopted those compromises through their legislative processes, after 
deliberation and public accountability.64 
Moreover, civil unions serve as a potential bridge between gay 
people and social conservatives.  They are a compromise that allows 
each group what it most desires:  civil support for same-sex partner-
ships (the primary need for lesbian and gay Americans), but without 
invoking the hallowed institution of marriage (a point of greatest 
concern for social conservatives).  More importantly, civil unions con-
stitute a compromise that is also a social experiment, for they create a 
growing population of quasi-married lesbian and gay couples, often 
with families.  After experience with civil unions, will the gay rights 
movement still insist on marriage?  Will social conservatives find that 
gay relationships have the adverse effects predicted for society? 
C.  Voluntary Race-Conscious Integration School Plans 
Another form of equality practice has been going on in local 
school boards for the last generation.  Disappointed that public 
schools remain largely segregated by race decades after Brown, par-
ents, administrators, and experts have been devising plans to inte-
grate or reintegrate schools.  Such plans usually include race-based 
criteria.  For example, Seattle School District No. 1 sought a better 
racial mix for its ten high schools and, to that end, developed new 
pupil assignment criteria.  The main sorting mechanism was parental 
choice, but one of the tiebreakers when too many parents opted for a 
popular school was to prefer pupils whose race would contribute to 
that school’s racial diversity.  Concerned parents sued the school dis-
trict on the ground that the race-based tiebreaker violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.  A 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court agreed and 
struck down the plan in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1.65 
Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion for a plurality of Justices has 
been faulted for disrupting the democratic process without firm sup-
port in standard legal sources, namely, constitutional text, original 
meaning, and precedent.66  Like other Supreme Court opinions over-
 
 64 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE:  CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY 
RIGHTS (2002) (arguing for “equality practice,” incremental and often legislatively driven 
change, as a way to ensure legal rights and equal treatment by the State for same-sex cou-
ples). 
 65 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746–68 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2788–97 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 66 See id. at 2800–37 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting a scorched-earth assault on the Chief 
Justice’s factual assumptions and legal reasoning). 
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turning remedial race-based programs, Parents Involved can also be 
criticized for treating a helping hand the same as the back of the 
hand across the face.  Justice Stevens once put the point this way: 
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is 
designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate ra-
cial subordination.  Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, 
subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of the 
majority.  Remedial race-based preferences reflect the opposite impulse:  
a desire to foster equality in society.67 
Justice Stevens’s point is consistent with the original purpose of 
the Equal Protection Clause; what my theory adds is that Parents In-
volved is in tension with the pluralistic themes in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Constitution of 1789, and the Bill of Rights.  Thus, 
the Seattle plan seems like the precise obverse of the “class legisla-
tion” that was the Equal Protection Clause’s core purpose to monitor.  
Unlike class legislation, which was traditionally partial and exclusion-
ary, the Seattle plan was inclusive and embracing.  Unlike class legis-
lation, which was often a mechanism for entrenching a social group 
as an underclass, the Seattle plan sought to reverse trends which 
threatened some communities of color with becoming an underclass.  
(The contrast with Plyler v. Doe could hardly be more striking.)  Un-
like class legislation, which was traditionally engineered by a majority 
group to enhance its own power, the Seattle plan was engineered by a 
pluralist multi-racial coalition of educators, parents, and elected 
school board members who were genuinely seeking the public inter-
est.  Speaking for a majority of breast-beating, original-meaning Jus-
 
 67 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See 
generally Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 705 (arguing “for a large expansion of our current commitment to cul-
tural diversity on the ground that law schools are political institutions”); Randall Ken-
nedy, Persuasion and Distrust:  A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1327 (1986) (concluding that “affirmative action should generally be retained as a tool of 
public policy because, on balance, it is useful in overcoming entrenched racial hierarchy,” 
and arguing that “division within the civil rights coalition is not the only conflict permeat-
ing the affirmative action controversy”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, Sins of Discrimi-
nation:  Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986) (“[T]he Court has 
approved affirmative action only as precise penance for the specific sins of racism a gov-
ernment, union, or employer has committed in the past.”); Patricia J. Williams, Com-
ment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC:  Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
525 (1990) (assessing the significance of Metro Broadcasting in regard to group claims, and 
analyzing the “costs of pitting individual rights against group interests at a moment in our 
history when such groupings as race and class intersect so that race increasingly defines 
class and the property interests of large numbers of white individuals are understood to 
be in irreconcilable tension with the collective dispossession of large numbers of people 
of color”). 
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tices, the Chief Justice’s opinion was conspicuous in its historical am-
nesia. 
My theory suggests a greater appreciation, however, for Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion.  (The Chief Justice spoke for the 
Court in striking down the Seattle plan, but not as to all the points of 
equal protection analysis.)  On the one hand, Justice Kennedy agreed 
with the four dissenters that diversity, as well as remedying the effects 
of past discrimination, can justify some race-based preferences.68  My 
pluralism-facilitating theory of equal protection strongly supports that 
point and would insist that a stable majority of the Court adhere to it 
in subsequent cases.  But my theory also takes a critical point from 
Justice Kennedy:  race is a sensitive criterion, and the Seattle plan in 
particular used the criterion crudely, categorizing everyone as white 
or nonwhite and ignoring other criteria that would have yielded 
greater diversity than a criterion grounded upon a crude racial sort-
ing.69  For example, under the Seattle plan a school, where 60% of 
the students had Northern European ancestry and 40% African an-
cestry, would be considered just as diverse as a school with 60% 
Northern European, 20% Latino, 5% African, and 5% Asian ances-
tries.  Justice Kennedy was right to be concerned about such a plan.  
He also worried that the Seattle plan yielded no more, and perhaps 
less, diversity than a plan considering students’ economic back-
grounds. 
A pluralism-facilitating reading of Parents Involved would empha-
size the features of the case that troubled Justice Kennedy.  Such a 
reading is supported not only by ordinary principles of precedent, 
which would view Justice Kennedy’s opinion as the controlling one 
on these disputed points of law, but also principles of pluralism.  If 
there is a silver lining from Parents Involved (this remains to be seen), 
it is that school boards should be encouraged to create more con-
structive plans that invite a more pluralistic public school system not 
dominated by pure race-based preferences. 
 
 68 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2788–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
 69 Id. at 2792–97. 
